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Design of Three 
Field Experiments
Walter A. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman
INTRODUCTION: WHAT MAKES AN EXPERIMENT 
AN EXPERIMENT?
The modern concept of experimental design is primarily a result of
the work of R.A. Fisher, who developed the concept in the 1920s while
conducting agricultural field experiments in England (see Fisher 1960;
Fisher 1968).  Fisher’s approach had several statistical features and
relied on randomization as the key to providing estimates of response
variability.  According to Charles Hicks (1982, p. 1): “A true experi-
ment may be defined as a study in which certain independent variables
are manipulated, . . . and the levels of these independent variables are
assigned at random to the experimental units in the study.”  In essence,
an experiment is a process of manipulation and randomization for the
purpose of measuring the underlying responses to treatments.  Its value
over observational studies lies in the increased ability to elucidate
cause-and-effect relationships (Fisher 1968, p. 246).  
Despite the history of controlled experiments in the laboratory and
the agricultural fields, the idea of such an approach did not enter the
realm of social science until Heather Ross, a candidate for a Ph.D. in
economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presented such a
plan to experiment with the negative income tax in a 1966 paper (Ross
1966, cited in Kershaw and Fair 1977).   Until that time, the concept of
manipulating human beings in the same manner as fertilizer or wheat
varieties was not considered.  However, the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO) was eagerly searching for new ways to evaluate alterna-
tive negative income tax proposals and the academic community was
eager to apply newly developed econometric and data handling tech-
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niques.  The result was the New Jersey Income Maintenance Experi-
ment, which was soon followed by income maintenance experiments in
Seattle, Denver, Gary, and two rural areas.  Experiments with housing
vouchers, health insurance, and residential electricity pricing followed.
New at the time was the idea that it was reasonable to establish a con-
trol group that represented a null treatment only in the sense that the
particular intervention being tested was withheld.  In every other sense,
the control group represented the status quo—affected by all the pro-
grams, policies, and economic perturbations that existed in the general
population.  As we will see, experimentation in general and randomiza-
tion in particular is often not as clean in practice as it is in principle.
Randomization is the process of selecting individuals from a speci-
fied population and placing them into one or more groups by a blind
process that, in principle, assures that on average the characteristics of
the members of the groups are the same.1  This goal can be accom-
plished using a random number generator or the last four digits of an
individual’s social security number to make the assignment.  If the pro-
cess is done correctly and the samples are sufficiently large, then the
members of each group will differ, on average, only due to experimen-
tal interventions.  Basically, there will be two groups: a “treatment”
group that receives the experimental intervention and a “control” group
that receives no treatment.  The number of experimental groups can be
expanded, with each group receiving a different treatment.  There will
invariably be a control group to represents the status quo because a
comparison between the treatment and control groups tells the evalua-
tors what can be expected if the treatment is imposed in the then-cur-
rent environment.  
In this chapter, the design of each of the three bonus experiments is
presented and the three are compared.  The next section examines eligi-
bility requirements for participation in the experiments.  The experi-
mental design is then described, comparing the nature of the treatments
among the three states and pointing out their differences and their more
pervasive similarities.  We then discuss the number and allocation of
participants in the experiment, followed by a discussion of the deci-
sions as to the location and number of experimental sites.  The environ-
ment within which each experiment was conducted, including the
relevant economic characteristics of the states during the periods in
which the experiments were conducted and the characteristics of the
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group of claimants selected to serve as a control group, is then
described.  We next evaluate the randomization process, whose object
was to create treatment and control groups that had essentially the
same characteristics, and then we describe the operation of the experi-
ments, pointing out the overriding similarities as well as the few differ-
ences in operational designs.  The final section briefly discusses an
unplanned experiment generated by the Federal Supplemental Com-
pensation program in Illinois.
ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION 
IN THE EXPERIMENTS
General Issues
Participation in an experiment should be guided by the expected
decision as to who would be eligible to participate in a program mod-
eled on the experiment.  Additional considerations that might further
limit experimental eligibility are the likelihood of participation in the
program and a desire to increase the homogeneity of the sample,
thereby reducing the sample size required to achieve a given level of
statistical reliability.
Although decisions regarding the characteristics of those eligible
to participate in an experiment should reflect the purposes of the exper-
imental program, limiting the sample also limits the information
obtained from the experiment.  For instance, in an experimental
employment program that had the goal of increasing the employability
of displaced workers, limiting enrollment to only displaced workers
would result in an experiment that provides no information on the rela-
tive effects of the program on displaced and nondisplaced workers.
Furthermore, a change in the definition of displacement would reduce
the usefulness of the results of an experiment that enrolled only dis-
placed workers under the old definition.  It is, however, a waste of
resources to include persons whose behavior is of no interest in reach-
ing the policy decisions.  If the resulting program has the reduction of
unemployment insurance (UI) costs as a major goal, then it would
seem to be unnecessary to include in the experiment persons not eligi-
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ble for UI benefits, unless UI eligibility is affected by the experimental
program.
Such an effect can arise because of the potential for an experimen-
tal program to generate unwanted increases in program participation
(e.g., additional filing for UI benefits).  This so-called “entry effect” is
usually undetected in an experimental evaluation (see Moffit 1992).2
In the UI bonus experiments (henceforth referred to simply as the
“bonus experiments”), entry effects could only be determined if both
employed and unemployed workers (including those not filing for ben-
efits) were enrolled.  This was not the case in any of the bonus experi-
ments, thereby precluding any experimental measurement of entry
effects.  This issue is discussed more completely in Chapter 6 with
regard to the bonus experiments.
Eliminating from a sample some persons who would be eligible to
participate in the ensuing program is done primarily to reduce costs.
For example, if relatively young and relatively old workers respond to
programs differently than those in the age group 25 to 55, concentrat-
ing on the middle age group would reduce the sample size needed for
any given degree of reliability.  Of course, the results fail to inform the
policymaker about the effects of the program on the excluded age
groups.
Who responds to the treatment is relevant to the determination of
net benefits, because of the potential for windfall gains, which are
gains that accrue to participants in an experiment who receive the treat-
ment benefits (such as a bonus payment) without any change in behav-
ior.  An example would be a program to pay moving expenses to
unemployed workers who take jobs outside their area of current resi-
dence; windfall gain will be the payments to those who would have
moved without the reimbursement.  Net benefits will be larger as the
proportion of payments made to such nonresponders gets smaller.
However, windfall gain cannot be reduced to zero for two reasons: 1)
equity considerations require a relatively comprehensive definition of
eligibility (e.g., if black workers don’t respond to the treatment, you
cannot design a program that makes payments only to white workers),
and 2) behavioral response is measured indirectly by a comparison of
group behaviors; individual response is only inferred on a probabilistic
basis.
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Windfall gain is minimized by excluding from eligibility groups
whose members have a low probability of responding to the treatment
and whose exclusion does not involve substantial equity issues.  For
instance, in the bonus experiments, not paying bonuses to claimants
who returned to their previous jobs helped reduce windfall gain.  
Eligibility to Participate in the Bonus Offer Experiments 
All three experiments started from the premise that a major experi-
mental objective was to reduce costs to the UI trust funds by reducing
the length of insured unemployment.  Offering a bonus to unemployed
workers who were not eligible to receive UI benefits would not contrib-
ute to achieving this goal because no change in the behavior of ineligi-
ble claimants could reduce UI benefit payments.  With an exception of
a few cases in Washington, all three experiments required that UI eligi-
bility be established.3  The criteria of UI eligibility meant that the
claimant must have been monetarily eligible to receive benefits payable
out of the host state’s trust fund.  Thus, veterans receiving benefits
under the UCX (unemployment compensation for ex-service members)
program, claimants with only interstate claims, and ex-federal employ-
ees under the UCFE (unemployment compensation for federal employ-
ees) program were all excluded because their benefits would not be
paid out of the state trust funds.  As shown in Table 2.1, these condi-
tions were uniform across the three experiments; other conditions were
not.  The eligibility conditions in Table 2.1 are described in the sections
that follow.  
New benefit year
All three experiments required that the claimant be filing to estab-
lish a new benefit year.  (See the Glossary on p. 275 for definitions of
“benefit year” and other UI terms.)  This requirement was imposed for
two reasons: 1) it was felt that, in a steady state, the bonus offer would
be made at the start of a benefit year and not sometime in its midst and
thus the requirement would replicate that expected in a real program;
and 2) it created a valuable homogeneity characteristic in that all
experimental subjects would start with the same unemployment history
(at least with regard to the current spell).  In Washington, but not in Illi-
nois or Pennsylvania, claimants filing “transitional” claims were eligi-
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ble to participate.   In a real program, it is doubtful that a claimant who
received an offer in the initial benefit year would receive a repeat offer
in a transitional year.  
Monetary eligibility
As mentioned above, the programmatic goal of reducing UI system
costs led all three experiments to require monetary eligibility for UI as
a condition for participation in the experiments.  In Pennsylvania and
Illinois, a monetarily valid claim had to be established at the time the
claimant filed for the first compensable week and/or the waiting week.  
Table 2.1 Eligibility Conditions for Participation in the Experimentsa
Eligibility conditions Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
To participate
New benefit year Y Y Y
Monetarily eligible for UI Y Y Y
Monetarily eligible for UI at 
time of filing
N N Y
No separation issues Y Y N
Not totally interstate, UCFE, 
or UCX
Y Y Y
Not on standby or a referral 
union member
N Y N
Register with job service Y N N
Backdated claims more than 
two weeks disallowed
N Y N
To receive a bonus
Terminate benefits, become 
employed for 4 months
Y Y Y
Not be recalled, placed 
by union
N Y Y
Nonmonetarily eligible to 
receive benefits
Y Y Y
a Y: yes, it is a condition; N: no, it is not a condition.
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The requirements for monetary eligibility were more stringent in
Washington.  Only a claimant who had a monetarily valid claim at the
time of initial filing was enrolled in the experiment.  Thus, certain cate-
gories of claimants, particularly laid-off state employees whose wage
histories would not be in the file at the time of filing and whose mone-
tary eligibility would not be established until after filing, were
excluded from the Washington experiment.  This made administration
of the experiment easier and permitted fixed dollar offers to be made at
the time of enrollment.  It is likely that the more equitable approach
used in Illinois and Pennsylvania would be followed in a real program.  
Nonmonetary eligibility
Claimants who were nonmonetarily ineligible for the duration of
their claim were also not eligible to receive a bonus in any of the three
experiments.  Duration exclusions usually occurred because of “sepa-
ration” issues; i.e., the claimant had been fired for cause or had volun-
tarily quit (does not include “good cause” quits, such as for sexual
harassment).  Nonduration issues, such as not being available for work,
did not preclude eligibility for any of the experiments because these
conditions were removable by the decision to search actively for work,
an event regarded as positive for the experiment.  
 Nonmonetary ineligibility was handled somewhat differently in
each of the three experiments.  In all experiments, bonus offers were
made to all who were monetarily eligible.  However, in Washington
and Illinois, an offer letter (officially making the offer) would not be
sent until all nonmonetary duration stops had been removed for at least
one week.  If the stops were removed during the qualification period,
then a bonus offer was made and a bonus could be collected.  In Penn-
sylvania, nonmonetary eligibility was checked when the bonus was
claimed.  Individuals who had been disqualified for the duration of
their unemployment were not eligible to receive the bonus, but individ-
uals disqualified for shorter periods could receive the bonus.  
Not totally interstate, UCFE or UCX
Interstate claims are filed by claimants whose wage credits were
accumulated in another state; that state is then charged with the costs of
benefit payments for the interstate claimant.  UCFE is the code for fed-
eral employees and UCX is the code for veterans who have been
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recently discharged from the service.  In both of these cases, the bene-
fits are paid under special programs by the federal government.  All
three experiments eliminated these groups, because UI payments for
these claims were not made out of the state UI trust funds, therefore
there was no potential saving to the state UI systems for these groups.
A universal system would probably include these groups. 
Recall status or referral union member
In an effort to reduce windfall gain, groups of individuals whose ex
ante identification could be used for screening and whose length of
unemployment was primarily determined by someone other than them-
selves were excluded from the Pennsylvania experiment.  One such
group was UI claimants on standby awaiting recall to a prior job.  A
second group was members of full referral unions (i.e., unions that
operate hiring halls and take full responsibility for placing their mem-
bers).  Claimants on standby with specific recall dates within 60 days
and claimants who were members of full referral unions were exempt
from UI work-search requirements in all three states.  
The three experiments had different rules regarding participation
of UI claimants on standby or of members of full referral unions, but
the effects were not that different.  These claimants were not eligible to
participate in the Pennsylvania experiment as stated above, did not
generally participate in the Illinois experiment, and were fully eligible
to participate in the Washington experiment.  In both Pennsylvania and
Washington, however, claimants who were in fact recalled to their pre-
vious job were ineligible to receive bonuses, even if they had been
enrolled in the experiment.  In Washington (but not in Pennsylvania),
the same was true for claimants who had been placed on their first post-
unemployment jobs through union hiring halls.  In Illinois, there was
no prohibition against paying bonuses to recalled workers or to work-
ers placed on jobs through a union hiring hall.  However, workers
expecting recall with firm recall dates or expecting to be placed by the
union were not required to register with the ES and generally did not
do so.  If they did not show up the ES office, they would not have been
enrolled in the experiment.  Thus, most of such UI claimants were de
facto excluded from the Illinois experiment. 
For the Washington experiment, the rationale ran as follows: even
an individual on standby or a member of a full referral union can seek,
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and obtain, other employment.  Thus, the claimant’s behavior can be
influenced by a bonus offer, and he or she should have the opportunity
to change behavior.  However, there is no reason to pay a bonus to
someone who is in fact recalled to his or her previous job or placed
through the union hiring hall since the bonus offer could not have influ-
enced that decision.4  If the claimant could demonstrate that the job
with the previous employer was a “new” job, then bonus payment
would not be withheld.  It was not desirable for the bonus offer to dis-
courage workers who had been laid off from one job in a company
from taking an entirely different job in the same company.5
In the design stage, several union representatives objected to this
provision but went along with it as an experiment, although they stated
that they would oppose this provision if the bonus offer were to
become a regular UI program.  Table 2.2 summarizes the recall require-
ments in the bonus experiments.
Although these rules were somewhat different among the states,
the end results were similar in that recalled workers did not receive
bonuses in Pennsylvania and Washington, and most of such workers
had not registered with the ES in Illinois and thus were ineligible for
the bonus.
Backdated claims
Backdating refers to the process of starting a benefit year at a date
prior to the Sunday of the filing week.  A one-week backdating to cover
the waiting week often occurs if there is good reason for the claimant
Table 2.2 UI and Bonus Eligibility for Workers Expecting Recalla
Bonus
Enrollment
receipt Recalled worker can 
receive bonus
Recalled worker cannot 
receive bonus
Worker on standby can 
enroll in experiment
Illinois (only if worker 
registers with ES)
Washington
Worker on standby cannot 
enroll in experiment
Pennsylvania
Illinois (if worker does not 
register with ES)
a Definitions of recall: Washington, return to same job with layoff employer; Pennsyl-
vania, have recall date with layoff employer.
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not filing in the first unemployment week.  More extensive backdating
occasionally occurs for a variety of reasons (e.g., claimant was ill).  In
the Pennsylvania experiment, a claim backdated more than two weeks
made the claimant ineligible to participate in Pennsylvania.  There
were no such restrictions in Washington or Illinois.6
Register with the Job Service
Registration for job search was an explicit requirement for partici-
pation only in the Illinois experiment.  In Illinois, enrollment took
place in the ES office at the time the claimant registered for job search.
Such registration was required of all claimants not explicitly exempted
from job search.7
NATURE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS
General Issues
A treatment is a particular program configuration that participants
are offered or required to accept.  A treatment may be a single well-
defined program element (e.g., the offer of a $500 reemployment
bonus) or it may be a combination of several program elements.  For
example, a treatment may combine an offer of a reemployment bonus
with job-search assistance.  If this is the only treatment, then the exper-
imental results will be valid only for that particular combination of pro-
gram elements.  To determine the contribution of any one program
component, it is necessary to have more than one treatment that prop-
erly nests the program components: for example, one treatment with
bonus offer only, a second treatment with job-search assistance and
work search requirements only, and a third that combines the two.  The
third treatment is necessary only if you believe that all the components
together will have a different effect than the sum of the effects of the
separate components (i.e., a strong interactive effect among the pro-
gram components).  If this is not the case, then either treatment 2 or 3
could be dropped.
In most social program experiments, those eligible members of the
population assigned to the experiments are free to accept or reject par-
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ticipation in the program.8  For instance, UI claimants assigned to
receive bonus offers were not required to either change job-search
behavior or file for a bonus if they met the conditions for payment.  As
long as all individuals assigned to the treatment group are considered
members for evaluative purposes, no harm is done to experimental
integrity by having acceptance of the program voluntary.
Variation in the level or quantity of the program elements is neces-
sary if an experimental objective is to evaluate more than one level of a
program or, more aggressively, to determine an optimum level for a
program.  If a program has more than one level (e.g., different support
levels for an income maintenance program or different bonus offers for
a reemployment bonus program), then interpolation between two treat-
ments in the experiment can be used to estimate the effects of programs
levels that have not been tested but that lie between the two tested lev-
els.  This, of course, is “modeling” in the strict sense, but the necessary
assumptions are sufficiently weak as to not cause undue concern.  Of
course, if three levels are tested, then the linearity assumption can be
more strongly evaluated.  
Elements of the Bonus Treatment
The three bonus offer experiments all had the same three basic
components: 1) the bonus amount—the dollar value of the bonus offer,
2) the qualification period—the length of time from the date of enroll-
ment into the experiment to the last date on which the claimant must
start a qualifying job, and 3) the reemployment period—the length of
time after starting a qualifying job that the claimant must remain fully
employed in order to collect the bonus.9  The first two components var-
ied among the three experiments, but the third did not.  The reemploy-
ment period was set at four months in all experiments (16 weeks in
Pennsylvania).  The variations in bonus amount offered and qualifica-
tion period among the three experiments are shown in Table 2.3. 
The value of the bonus offer
Recognizing that acceptance of a bonus offer is intended to gener-
ate a change in job-seeking or job-accepting behavior, there is an
implicit trade-off facing the claimant between the bonus and the UI
benefits that will be foregone by taking a job sooner than would have
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been the case without the bonus offer.  The value of a week’s worth of
UI benefits is represented by the weekly benefit amount (WBA).  Thus,
a fixed dollar offer is worth more to a claimant with a low WBA than to
a claimant with a high WBA because each week’s reduction in benefit
payments is more costly to the latter.  With this view of the bonus offer,
the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments both priced the bonus
offer in multiples of the WBA.  For example, a bonus offer equal to 3 ×
WBA implies that all claimants are offered a bonus equal to three
weeks of UI benefits.















All bonus offers 500 11 500 11 
Pennsylvania
Short-low bonus offers 3 × WBAb 6 500 6 
Short-high bonus offers 6 × WBA 6 1,003 6 
Long-low bonus offers 3 × WBA 12 498 12 
Long-high bonus offers 6 × WBA 12 989 12 
Washington





4 × WBA (0.2 × UI 
duration) + 1
610 5.8 
Short-high bonus offers 6 × WBA (0.2 × UI 
duration) + 1
917 5.7 






4 × WBA (0.4 × UI
duration) + 1
612  11.0 
Long-high bonus offers 6 × WBA (0.4 × UI
duration) + 1
924 11.1 
a All dollar values are in nominal dollars.  See Chapter 8, note 2, for information on use
of the CPI to adjust the values for inflation.
b WBA: weekly benefit amount.
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A second issue facing the designers of the experiment involved the
range of bonus amounts—what should be the smallest and largest
WBA multiplier and how many different multipliers should be used?
The objective was to have a sufficient range and number of bonus
offers to enable evaluators to determine how response is affected by the
size of the bonus offer, thus permitting policymakers to select the most
cost-effective bonus offer.  The determination of the range and number
of options was partly determined by decisions on a likely policy range,
what differences would be large enough to elicit significant differences
in response, how many treatments would be necessary to properly map
the response surface, and finally, cost.  
Two bonus offers, one at the minimum and one at the maximum of
the feasible range, would be sufficient to provide a basis for estimating
the effects over a full range of options.  However, interpolations are
constrained to an assumption of linear differences in effects.  Thus, if
one treatment is at 2 × WBA and another is at 6 × WBA, then it must be
assumed that a treatment at 4 × WBA has an effect halfway between
that of the two observed treatments.  More than two bonus offer levels
would permit validation of this linear effect hypothesis or some estima-
tion of a nonlinear response surface.  The three experiments differed in
regard to ranges of offers.  The $500 bonus offer in the Illinois experi-
ment provided unplanned variations in the bonus/WBA ratio that
ranged from 3 × WBA to 10 × WBA.10  However, the natural differ-
ences in this ratio may correlate with other variables that affect behav-
ior and therefore do not provide as a good a basis for decision making
as planned variations.  Pennsylvania had two and Washington had three
planned levels of bonus/WBA offers.11
Although the treatments in Washington and Pennsylvania were
specified in terms of multiples of the claimant’s WBA, the actual offer
was for a fixed number of dollars.  Thus, a claimant who had a WBA of
$175 and an assigned treatment of 6 × WBA received a bonus offer of
$1,050.  The claimant was not made aware of the algorithm used to cal-
culate the bonus offer.  The actual dollar offers varied over a fairly wide
range, as follows:
Washington: the minimum bonus offer was $110 (2 × the mini-
mum WBA of $55) and the maximum offer was for $1,254 (6 × the
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maximum WBA of $209).  At the mean WBA of $153, a mid-range
offer of 4 × WBA would have a value of $612.  
Pennsylvania: the offers ranged from a minimum of $105 (3 × the
minimum WBA of $35) to a maximum offer of $1,596 (6 × the
maximum WBA of $266, increased from $252 in 1989).
Qualification period
The second component of the bonus offer is the qualification
period, i.e., the maximum duration of the initial spell of insured unem-
ployment that the participant could experience and still qualify for the
bonus.  The length of the qualification period is important because it
may influence the cost-effectiveness of the prospective program.  A
long qualification period will permit more eligible claimants to be
affected by the offer, while at the same time it increases the opportunity
for persons who do not alter their job seeking behavior to collect a
bonus.  These contradictory behavioral outcomes imply that the net
effect of differing qualification periods would need to be determined
empirically.  As a result, both the Washington and Pennsylvania experi-
ments varied the length of the qualification period. 
As noted above, earlier acceptance of a job to earn a bonus
imposes a cost to the participant equivalent to the amount of UI benefit
payments foregone.  The qualification period should be considered in
this context.  A 12-week qualification period is 46 percent of the enti-
tled duration of 26 weeks in Pennsylvania or Illinois.12  However, in
Washington, where the entitled duration ranges from 10 to 30 weeks, a
12-week qualification period may be as low as 40 percent of entitled
duration to more than 100 percent.  If claimant job-search behavior is
related to the length of entitlement, then a qualification period as a
fixed proportion of benefit duration rather than a fixed number of
weeks represents a more homogeneous treatment in a state with vari-
able benefit durations.
Thus, the Washington experiment design had two qualification
periods, one at 20 percent of the time that the individual claimant could
draw full benefits (i.e., the compensable duration) plus one week to
account for the waiting week, and a second set of treatments at 40 per-
cent of compensable duration plus one week.  If the algorithm resulted
in a qualification period having a fraction of a week, the qualification
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period was rounded to the next highest whole number of weeks.  Since
the duration of entitlement could run from 10 to 30 weeks, the short-
qualification-period treatments ranged from a minimum of three weeks
(0.2 × 10 + 1 week) to a maximum of seven weeks (0.2 × 30 + 1 week).
The long-qualification period ranged from five weeks (0.4 × 10 + 1
week) to a maximum of 13 weeks (0.4 × 30 + 1 week).
In Pennsylvania, the 6-week qualification period was 22 percent of
the 26-week entitlement faced by most claimants (i.e., 6/27ths of the
period, including the waiting week), and the 12-week qualification
period was 44 percent of the 26-week entitlement.  These proportions
are similar to those of the short and long qualifications in Washington.
In Illinois, the qualification period was fixed at 11 weeks, which was
40 percent of the 26-week fixed entitled duration of benefits in Illinois
(plus the waiting week).
The reemployment period
The reemployment period is the length of time that the participat-
ing claimant needed to remain fully employed after terminating receipt
of benefits in order to qualify for a bonus.  Four months was the length
of time selected for this parameter of the system in all of the experi-
ments (16 weeks in Pennsylvania).  Response was not expected to be
sufficiently sensitive to variations in this parameter to warrant varying
it experimentally.13  The four-month interval was believed to be suffi-
ciently long to avoid encouraging claimants to accept short-term
employment simply to qualify for a bonus.  It was also sufficiently long
to avoid payment for employment on temporary seasonal jobs (e.g.,
harvesting in the summer, Christmas employment, or canning in the
fishing season).
The reemployment period had to be served with the same employer
in Illinois, whereas it was only necessary that the claimant remain fully
employed in Pennsylvania and Washington, which was defined as tak-
ing not more than a week to change jobs and not filing for benefits dur-
ing the transition period.  Eighty to 85 percent of participants who
obtained qualifying jobs met the reemployment period conditions.
Surprisingly, there was little difference in this regard between Illinois
and the other two experiments.  
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DETERMINING THE NUMBER AND 
ALLOCATION OF PARTICIPANTS 
General Issues
Determining the number of claimants to enroll in the experiment
and the number to enroll in each treatment and the control group are
critical decisions.  Nothing is more frustrating than spending several
years and several million dollars on an experiment only to conclude
that the number of participants was too small to enable the evaluators
to draw statistically reliable conclusions about the results.  In the dis-
cussion to follow, the term sample size is used to describe the number
of claimants selected to participate in the experiment.  Despite its
importance, the subject of sample size is given little attention in books
on experimental or evaluation methodology.  In a 500-page book by
Rossi and Freeman (1989), sampling is mentioned only once and does
not merit inclusion in the index.  Hausman and Wise (1985) discussed
sampling as an issue of randomization and selection, not as an issue of
size and cost.  Cohen’s (1988) important book deals with the sample
size implications of statistical reliability, but not with cost and feasibil-
ity.  
On the other hand, actual experiments must deal with the trade-off
between cost and reliability in determining sample size.  In the early
income maintenance experiments, the question was posed as a mathe-
matical programming problem in which the sample was allocated
among income and treatment cells to get the maximum information
about labor supply response from a given budget.14  In this approach,
the question was never asked as to whether the response would be suf-
ficient for policy purposes.  
The correct approach is to provide answers to the following four
sequential questions.  1) What effect must the proposed experimental
program have in order to justify its implementation as a full program?
2) What sample size will be needed to generate a result such that, if the
true response is the expected response, the result will be statistically
significant?  3) How much will this experiment cost?  4) Is the answer
sufficiently important to justify the cost?  Thus, the experimental
designers must be prepared to abort the process if it is determined that
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the budget available for the experiment is insufficient to generate a
usable response.  Each of the four points, especially the first two, are
described in more detail below.  
Sample Design for the Bonus Experiments
The critical operational question for sample design was the number
of claimants that would need to be enrolled into each treatment or con-
trol group at each site to meet specified design goals.  The principal
design goal was to generate experimental samples that would have the
ability to detect specified changes in the parameters of interest, namely
the length of insured unemployment and the amount of UI benefit pay-
ments.
In the first bonus experiment, the Illinois experiment, these ques-
tions were not asked explicitly because the experimenters had no
guideline as to what changes to expect and no guidance from the state
as to what changes were of policy interest.  The approach in Illinois
was to first establish a budget for payment of bonuses, i.e., $750,000
for the two experiments based upon the Wagner-Payser funds available
to the state of Illinois for these purposes.15  The next step was to deter-
mine how many claimants needed to be enrolled in order to pay 1,500
bonuses of $500 each. 
In Washington, there was no predetermined budget at the point the
sample size was being determined.  The sample requirements were
based on the sample sizes needed in each treatment cell to detect
impacts on weeks of insured unemployment as large as those found in
the Illinois experiment (1.15 weeks).  Based on Washington budget
estimates, a budget was established by the U.S. Department of Labor
for the Pennsylvania experiment.  The sample design task in Pennsyl-
vania was then to allocate the budget to achieve an optimum amount of
information and to assure that the experiment could provide reasonable
results.  In the following discussion, we present the sample design pro-
cedures first for Illinois, then for Washington, and then the more elabo-
rate modeling that resulted in the Pennsylvania design. 
Sample design in Illinois
In Illinois, there were two treatments and a control group to which
assignments were to be made.16  The decision was made to assign one-
42 Corson and Spiegelman
third of the eligible population to each of the three groups.  This was to
be accomplished by using the last two digits of the claimant’s social
security number, a number which had been randomly generated,
thereby assuring random assignment of the eligible population.
The sample design task was to determine how many bonus offers
to make in order to make bonus payments of $500 each to 1,500 partic-
ipants in the two treatments (just sufficient to exhaust the $750,000
bonus budget).   The following estimates were made using the data pro-
vided by the Illinois Department of Employment Security (DES) on the
number of ES registrants filing new valid claims in the last available
quarter in the 19 UI offices that had been selected for the experiment:
1) the expected number of filers in Fall 1984 (the anticipated enroll-
ment period), 2) the proportion that would be expected to accept the
offer to enroll in the program, 3) the proportion that would be expected
to obtain jobs within the qualification period and retain them for at
least four months, and 4) an added proportion that might be expected to
meet these qualifications as a result of the bonus offer.  
The investigators arbitrarily assumed a refusal rate of 10 percent
(based generally on experience).  The estimated job acquisition rate of
0.317 was equal to the proportion of claimants in the observed period
who obtained employment within 10 weeks of filing (the experimental
design called for 11 weeks, but the data were provided on a 1–10 and
11–15 week basis).  Of those obtaining employment, about 80 percent
were estimated to have retained their jobs for at least four months,
reducing to 1,212 the number of enrolled claimants expected to earn a
bonus without any impact on behavior.  We then assumed that two-
thirds of those who actually terminated benefits in the 11–15 week
period would respond to the bonus and reduce their unemployment
spell below 11 weeks.  Based on data for the period between July and
September 1983, this would add 294 bonus recipients, bringing to
1,506 the expected number of bonus payments.
This rather ad hoc method of estimation was designed to provide a
benchmark for enrollment.  Continuous monitoring of the enrollment
process was used to provide real-time estimates of the number of
claimants terminating benefits within the qualification period and filing
a notice in that regard.  This monitoring process permitted the state to
modify enrollment rates and determine the length of the enrollment
period based on actual experience.  
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In the end, however, only 570 bonuses were paid, leaving half of
the bonus budget on the table.  A major reason for the large overesti-
mate was the failure of the model to consider that many claimants
would meet all the conditions for bonus eligibility but not apply (see
discussion of the “take-up” issue in Chapter 3).  This was particularly
true in the employer experiment.  While the model predicted that 29
percent of assigned eligible claimants would collect bonuses, the
employer experiment paid bonuses to only 3 percent of the employers
of eligible claimants.  The claimant experiment also fell short of its
goal, but by a considerably smaller amount.  Fourteen percent of
assigned eligible claimants collected bonuses, against a predicted 29
percent.  (The shortfall in bonus payments was somewhat mitigated by
assigning an additional 2,900 eligible claimants.)
Sample design in Washington
In Washington, sample sizes were selected to enable measurement
of changes in key parameters vis-à-vis the control group.  In determin-
ing the sample, attention was focused on the duration of insured unem-
ployment, and sample sizes in each treatment were set to detect an
experimental effect as large as that found in the Illinois experiment,
i.e., 1.15 weeks.
Statistical texts such as Cohen (1988) provide the information nec-
essary to determine sample size requirements utilizing four pieces of
information: the number of treatment and control groups in the experi-
ment, the estimated (or desired) experimental effect for each treatment
group, an estimate of the standard deviation of the population, and the
desired statistical properties of the results.
The required sample size for an experimental cell is dictated by
two policy criteria: 1) the policymaker wants to have a high degree of
confidence that it does not implement an ineffective policy and 2) the
policymaker also wants confidence that it does not reject an effective
policy.  To meet these dual objectives, two statistical tests are adminis-
tered: 1) a test of statistical significance, which means that, if a pro-
gram is judged to be effective, the level of statistical significance gives
the probability that this judgment is wrong, and 2) the power evalua-
tion, which gives the probability that if a program is effective, our test
will reveal it to be so. 
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A statistical significance level of 5 percent and a power of 80 per-
cent is a typical combination of standards used by many analysts.  If a
program is judged to have an effect using these standards, there is a 5
percent probability that there is no effect and there is an 80 percent
chance of detecting an effect when there is one.  A decision must also
be made as to whether a one-tailed or two-tailed significance level is to
be used.  The two-tailed test is generally preferred, unless it is almost
certain that policy interest is in only one direction.17
In Washington, we imposed a more stringent 1 percent statistical
significance test but used only the one-tailed criteria.18  The 0.01 sig-
nificance test was used with a power of 0.8.  A table from Cohen
(1977, pp. 54–55), part of which is reproduced as Table 2.4, shows
that each cell would need at least 2,000 observations to meet these
conditions.
 To apply the Cohen table, the appropriate effect size index must be
determined.  For the Washington experiment, the effect size index was
determined to be 0.1, based on a desire to measure a 1.15-week impact
on weeks of insured unemployment and the determination that the
standard deviation of the distribution of weeks in the population was
about 12 weeks.  The effect size index is the estimated impact in stan-
dard deviation units (i.e., 1.15/12).19  The data in the table show that the
sample size is very sensitive to the power requirements.20
The sample size requirement relates to that of a single cell.  The
next step in determining total sample size is to set the number of cells
(treatment and control groups) and the degree of variation among treat-
Table 2.4 Sample Sizes for Treatment Group, 
Significance Level (one-tailed) = 0.01
Power Effect size index = 0.1a Effect size index = 0.2
0.5 1,083  272
0.6 1,332  334
0.7 1,627  408
0.8 2,009  503
0.9 2,605  652
SOURCE: Cohen (1977), Table 2.4.1, p. 55.
a See text for discussion and calculation of effect size index.
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ments.  In determining sample size, the same considerations hold in
designing experiments to distinguish between the impact of two treat-
ments as in measuring the impact of a treatment relative to a control
group.21  If the basic treatment is an offer of a $500 bonus (compared
with zero), much larger samples would be needed to detect the differ-
ence in impact of a $600 bonus offer.  In Washington, each treatment
progressed in increments of 2 × WBA.  Since the Illinois treatment was
equivalent to about 4 × WBA, we should have considered larger sample
sizes to detect differences in impact among the treatments.  
For a comparison of treatments that represent different quantitative
measures of the same variable, imposition of some modeling con-
straints can reduce the sample size requirement.  In the Seattle/Denver
Income Maintenance Experiment there were 11 treatments.  However,
much of the analysis was conducted using a labor supply model in
which the differences across treatments in tax rates and support levels
were reduced to a model with two variables, thereby substantially
reducing the sample size requirements for estimating experimental
effects (see Spiegelman, Robins, and West 1983).  In the bonus experi-
ments, the bonus values and qualification periods were redefined as
continuous variables and estimated in a model with essentially two
variables.  The cost, of course, is the imposition of constraints on the
relationship among the treatment variables.  
To estimate the cost of a seven-cell experiment with an average
sample size of 2,000 observations per cell, it was necessary to estimate
the cost in bonus payments.  This required prediction of the average
value of the bonus payment and the take-up rate (i.e., the proportion of
eligible claimants who collected bonuses).  Since the experimental
design called for bonus offers to be multiples of the individual WBA, it
was no longer a fixed dollar amount as it had been in Illinois.  The final
sample design called for an unbalanced design underweighting the
more expensive treatments: 20 percent of the sample would be con-
trols; 15 percent in each of the four treatments with multipliers of 2 ×
WBA or 4 × WBA; and 10 percent of the sample in each of the two
treatments with a bonus multiplier of 6 × WBA.  The average bonus
offer was predicted to be $565 using the 1988 average WBA in the
state of Washington of $148 and an average multiplier of 3.8.  
The take-up rate was estimated to be 0.1875, leading to an
expected bonus cost per eligible claimant of about $106.  The take-up
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rate was loosely based on the Illinois experience of 0.14 and an expec-
tation that improved information to claimants and more extensive fol-
low-up procedures would increase take-up.  This did out not turn out to
be the case.
As a result of these estimates, the total sample of 12,000 treatment-
assigned claimants yielded a final budget estimate of about $1,270,000
(see Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992, p. 21).  The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor allocated $1.2 million for bonus payments.  Despite
some differences in actual parameters (the bonuses paid were larger
and the take-up rate lower than projected), careful online monitoring
led to actual bonus payments within 1 percent of those projected.
Sample design in Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, two major design goals were established: 1) the
ability to detect a UI cost saving of $150 (about one week of average
UI benefits) from the high bonus offer and 2) the ability to detect a
$150 cost saving of moving from a 12-week to a 6-week qualification
period.  A third, subsidiary goal was to detect a $150 cost saving from
the removal of the workshop offer.22  Saving of a week’s worth of bene-
fit payments was about the average saving in Illinois and in the New
Jersey experiment (although the Illinois saving resulted from a bonus
offer closer to 4 × WBA, rather than the 6 × WBA in Pennsylvania).
The sample sizes per treatment cell were those necessary to meet the
measurement goals at a minimum of 80 percent power for a one-tailed
test at the 5 percent significant level. 
A formal sample allocation model was developed for Pennsylva-
nia, based on the design objectives, on assumptions about the magni-
tude of the response to the bonus offer, on the cost of individual
treatments, and on an overall budgetary constraint for the treat-
ments.23  The sample allocation obtained from the model provided for
3,000 control and 10,120 treatment group members allocated among
the six treatments, with cell sizes ranging from 1,030 to 2,240.  In the
end, the high-bonus, long-qualification-period treatment, both with and
without workshop, had 3,370 observations (see Corson et al. (1991),
Table I.2, p. 12).
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SELECTION OF EXPERIMENTAL SITES
General Issues
Determining where to conduct the experiment (site selection) is an
often trivialized activity that in fact is as important as determining the
number of individuals to enroll in the experiment.  The number of sites
has important experimental ramifications.  As the number of sites
increase, several things occur: 1) the effects on the results due to the
idiosyncratic actions of specific site administrators are reduced; 2) the
influence of external shocks that may occur during the experiment in
specific sites (e.g., a major plant closing) is mitigated; 3) the experi-
mental sample, and thus the results, become more representative of a
larger population group (i.e., a state instead of a city); and 4) the
administrative costs increase.24
Although the increased administrative costs of a large number of
sites is usually small relative to the total cost of an experiment, control
over experimental operations—which is important—is weakened in a
multisite experiment.  The staff of the organizational unit managing
experimental operations is usually small, making it difficult to properly
monitor operations occurring simultaneously in many sites.  
A case may also be made for a small number of sites if there are
effects of scale in the operations.  This is of little consequence in a
bonus offer program but is important in workfare-type programs, in
which a whole office is mobilized to carry out the experimental pro-
gram.  It is also important in training programs, where the breadth of
the offering is important, and in counseling programs, where the exist-
ence of a dedicated staff is important. 
Site selection may not arise in experiments that are conducted
statewide.  The U.S. Department of Labor had a requirement that
experimental populations should be representative of the state in which
the experiment was conducted.  In the Washington experiment, this was
accomplished by conducting the experiment in almost all of the state’s
Job Service Centers.
When the number of sites is a small proportion of the total avail-
able, site selection should be viewed as the first stage in a two-stage
sampling process and the principles of randomization should apply to
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both stages; that is, there should be random selection of sites and ran-
dom selection of sample observations within selected sites.  Metcalf
and Kerachsky (1988) pointed out that failure to recognize that site dif-
ferences contribute to the variance in the parameter estimates can lead
to design errors. 
Site Selection in the Bonus Experiments
With a total desired sample size determined, the next step is to
determine where within each state to conduct the experiment.  This
decision is intimately tied to sample size considerations, as well as to
determination of the length of the enrollment period.  The total sample
size, number of sites in which the experiment is conducted, rate of
enrollment at each site, and length of the enrollment period are all tied
together in a single equation.  A decision with regard to any one of
these variables affects the parameters of the others.  
In Pennsylvania and Washington, UI offices for filing claims
served as sites.  Employment Service offices for registering claimants
(and others) for job search were the sites in Illinois.  In Washington, UI
and ES offices were coterminous.  In Pennsylvania, there are both cote-
rminous and noncoterminous sites, but only the former were included
in the experiment.  Illinois also had both coterminous and noncotermi-
nous sites, but both were included in the experiment.  The decisions as
to the number of sites, their location within the state, and the flow rate
of enrollees were made on the basis of several complex considerations,
including the following. 
1) Reliance on local office staffs with no previous experience in
administering a bonus offer program indicated that a large num-
ber of agency personnel should be involved in order to reduce
the influence of any individual agents.  On the other hand, the
need to train agency personnel and monitor their performance
put practical ceilings on the number of sites.
2) The sensitivity of the results to job-search success indicated the
need to minimize the potential impact of specific labor market
influences, such as adverse weather or a large plant closing.
3) The desire to be able to generalize the results dictated that the
experimental sample be representative of the state or other large
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populations (coupled with the U.S. Department of Labor
requirements for Washington and Pennsylvania that the sample
replicate the characteristics of the host state population).
4) Treatment consisted only of cash offers in Illinois and Washing-
ton, so there was no critical mass needed to conduct the experi-
ment.  Pennsylvania, with its job-search assistance component,
did have the potential of enrollment rates being too low to main-
tain a program effort.  Even in Illinois and Washington, how-
ever, there were minimums because of the need to train agency
personnel to conduct enrollment interviews and the desire to
keep a sufficient caseload to maintain staff interest and capabil-
ity.  There were no numbers attached to this requirement, but
enrolling 16 percent of eligible new claimants in Washington
was regarded as a minimum.  
5) The previous four considerations all deal with establishing min-
imum sample sizes.  There were also some issues that would
tend to set maximum sample size.  During the four-month
enrollment period in Illinois, all eligible claimants were offered
the opportunity to enroll.  The operational burden on the coun-
seling staff was not a consideration because it was a time that
caseloads were falling and counselors were easily able to handle
the additional workload.  In Washington and Pennsylvania, how-
ever, there were practical limits to the enrollment rate, because
hiring new personnel was not considered and the ability to add
caseloads to the existing staff was limited.  The desire to reduce
the possibility of displacement of control group members also
supported the decision not to enroll all eligible participants at a
single site.  In Washington, 16 percent of eligibles were enrolled
at 20 of the 21 sites, and 32 percent enrolled at the remaining
site.  In Pennsylvania, 26 percent of eligible UI claimants were
enrolled.  These percentages are large enough to raise the spec-
tor of displacement, an issue discussed in Chapter 6. 
Site selection in Illinois
In Illinois, 22 Employment Service offices (also referred to as Job
Service Centers) were used as experimental sites.  Enrollment into the
experiment was carried out by Employment Service counselors.
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Although job-search services are often provided by the Employment
Service and UI offices under a single roof, only 10 of the 22 Employ-
ment Service offices in which the experiment was conducted had coter-
minous Employment Service and UI offices, and almost all of these
were outside of Chicago.25
Offices south of Springfield were eliminated to reduce administra-
tive costs and to make the sample more representative of the industrial
base; employment in the south of the state was more heavily in agri-
culture and mining.  The central and northern areas were divided into
four regions: Chicago (eight sites), Metro-outlying (four), Central
(four), and Northwest (five) areas of the state.  The largest offices in
each area were selected with a view of acquiring the necessary case-
load in four or fewer months and balancing the caseload among the
four areas.
Site selection in Washington
Site selection decisions emanated easily from the basic decision to
have the experimental sample replicate the characteristics of the state’s
population.  The decision was simply to eliminate as few sites as possi-
ble and carry out the experiment in the rest of the Job Service Centers
(all joint UI/ES offices.)  In the end, 10 of the state’s 31 Job Service
Centers were eliminated: seven were too small and remote, two were
part of other state experimental programs that could have contaminated
the results, and one (Vancouver) was part of the Portland, Oregon, met-
ropolitan area.  The 21 offices included in the study accounted for
approximately 85 percent of the state’s UI claims.  
The replication of state characteristics in the enrollment sites was
increased by doubling the sampling rate at one site, Rainier.  Because
of the elimination of Pierce County (Tacoma and Lakewood Job Ser-
vices), a large concentration of the state’s black population was elimi-
nated.  To compensate, enrollment in Rainier, located in King County
adjacent to Pierce County and also containing a large concentration of
the black population, was doubled.  As a result, the enrolled claimant
population had the racial mix of the state as a whole (i.e., about 85 per-
cent non-Hispanic white, 4 percent black, and 11 percent other).
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Site selection in Pennsylvania
An early decision was made to conduct the Pennsylvania experi-
ment in 12 sites, both for operational reasons and because analysis
showed that 12 sites was a sufficient number to reduce site-specific
effects on the variance to an acceptable size.  Desiring to enroll partici-
pants in only 12 of the state’s 87 UC offices and able to eliminate only
24 for cause (mostly for being too small or not having collocation of
Unemployment Compensation and Job Service offices), the researchers
adopted a process of stratified random sampling to select the 12 out of
the 63 eligible sites.   The principle was to assure that each eligible
claimant in the 63 sites had an equal chance of being selected into the
experiment.  With only 12 sites to be selected, the researchers wanted
to guard against an accidentally skewed selection of sites with regard to
administrative region of the state or duration of UI benefits.  The latter
stood as proxy for employment conditions in the local labor market.
Seven regions and four duration categories provided the potential for
stratification into 28 cells, which exceeded the number of sites to be
selected.  As described by Metcalf and Kerachsky (1988), the 28 cells
were condensed into 12 clusters with approximately equal size UI
caseloads.  One site was randomly selected from each cell.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
Characteristics of the States of Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington
Table 2.5 provides information on the three states in which bonus
experiments were conducted, permitting comparison among states and
over the two years for each state that were most relevant for the opera-
tional phases of the experiments.  What do we learn from this table that
is of importance to understanding the working of the bonus experi-
ments?
Illinois and Pennsylvania were close in size and population density
and experienced little population change over the relevant period.
Washington was considerably smaller and less dense, but it experi-
enced some modest population growth in the period.  Illinois had the
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Table 2.5 Characteristics of the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington 
States in Selected Years
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Characteristic 1984 1985 1989 1990 1988 1989
Population (000) 11,511 11,535 12,040 11,882 4,648 4,761
Pop/sq. mile 207 207 268 265 70 72
Racial groups (%)a
Black 14.7  9.2  3.1
Hispanic  5.6  2.0  4.4
Asian  0.2  1.2  1.3
Nat. American  0.1  0.1  1.7
Labor force (000)  5,604 5,673 5,857 5,901 2,295 2,451
Employment (000)  5,093 5,160 5,592 5,583 2,153 2,300
Insured unemployment 
rate (%)
 2.5 2.7 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.9
Total unemployment 
rate (%)
 8.4 8.9 4.8 5.8 5.8 5.5
Labor force 
participation (%)  
Male 76.8 78.2 73.4 73.2 74.1 76.9
Female 54.3 54.4 52.8 53.5 59.5 61.4
UI claims (000) 835 836 1044 1184 465 457
Exhaust. rate (%) 39.4 38.7 23.3 25.1 27.9 25.7
Avg. weekly wage ($) 364 377 419 441 393 403
Avg. compensation 
duration (weeks)
18.6 17.2 14.5 14.8 14.8 15.3
Avg. WBA ($) 134 136 182 189 151 156
WBA/weekly wage 0.368 0.361 0.434 0.429 0.384 0.387
SOURCE: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1984, 1985, 1988, 1989,
1990); U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992); U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Employment and Training Administration (1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990).
a Available only for census years: Illinois 1980; Pennsylvania 1990; Washington 1990.
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largest non-Caucasian population proportions and Washington the
smallest.  The proportion of blacks in Washington was considerably
below the national average.  
Labor force participation was similar, although male labor force
participation was somewhat higher in Illinois than in the other two
states and female labor force participation was somewhat higher in
Washington than in the other two.  Employment grew in both Illinois
and Washington in the relevant periods but declined slightly in Penn-
sylvania.  The total unemployment rate (TUR) was much higher in Illi-
nois in the period, which reflects the conditions at the time.  However,
the insured unemployment rate (IUR) did not differ much across the
states, despite the differences in TUR.
Relative to the sizes of the labor forces in the three states, it would
appear that initial claims were lower in Illinois and were fairly stable
across the two-year period.  The much higher exhaustion rate in Illinois
is consistent with the relatively low ratio of IUR to TUR in the state, as
one explanation for the low ratio is a large number of exhaustees who
remain unemployed.  However, the low initial claims in Illinois may
reflect a lower rate of layoffs in the early phases of a recovery that had
not yet translated into significant job growth.  The longer duration of
compensation in Illinois was consistent with greater exhaustion of ben-
efits and with the lingering effects of the recession.  (The durations are
for regular benefits and, therefore, do not include the effects of the
extended benefit program.)
The lower weekly wage rate in Illinois is consistent with the differ-
ence in timing of the experiments, fully reflecting the 3 percent rate of
inflation that characterized the period.  Overall, the Pennsylvania UI
program appears to be the more generous as displayed by the higher
WBA/weekly wage ratio, known as the “replacement rate.”
What does this information tell us about possible differences in
impact of the bonus offer among states?  The higher exhaustion rates
and longer durations of insured unemployment in Illinois imply either
1) worse job prospects for covered workers in this state, at that time,
than in the other two states or 2) a much greater tendency to use the UI
system to voluntarily extend unemployment.  The much higher TUR
suggests the former.  Employment growth was very modest, and the
increasing labor force participation led to increases in unemployment
rates—not suggestive of a situation in which increased job search
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would be productive.  However, to the extent it is successful, there
were potentially greater savings in Illinois, as the bonus responder
would be, on average, making a greater reduction in the length of the
unemployment spell than his peer in Pennsylvania or Washington.
Thus, the economic data from the states are ambiguous as a basis for
explaining the larger impact of the bonus offer in Illinois.  
The higher wage replacement rate in Pennsylvania implies that a
bonus offer representing the same ratio of bonus offer to WBA in the
three states is more generous in terms of earning equivalence in Penn-
sylvania, which leads to an expectation of greater response in Pennsyl-
vania.
Comparison of Control Groups across the Three Experiments
The control group represents the population from which the exper-
imental sample is drawn.  Differences and similarities among the con-
trol groups of the three experiments can help explain differences in the
effects of the experimental treatments.  Table 2.6 displays characteris-
tics (including basic demographic and economic characteristics) of the
control group members.  There are some potentially important similar-
ities and differences worth mentioning.  The Illinois sample was
slightly more female than the Washington or Pennsylvania samples,
which both show a 60/40 male/female split—not unlike the working
population.  The age distributions are remarkably similar in Pennsylva-
nia and Washington but differ by design in Illinois, which set 55 as the
maximum age for enrollment.  Nevertheless, the Illinois sample is even
younger than indicated by the design, because it differs from the other
two in the proportion of those under age 35.  
 In terms of racial differences, Illinois had a much lower proportion
of white non-Hispanics and a much higher proportion of blacks than
either Pennsylvania or Washington.  The proportion of blacks is partic-
ularly low in Washington, consistent with its population mix.  The
basic manufacturing/nonmanufacturing industrial mixes are essentially
the same in the three experiments.  
 The UI characteristics differ somewhat among the states.  The
lower WBA and base period earnings in Illinois probably reflects tim-
ing, since this experiment preceded the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments by about four years.  An annual increase at a compound
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Table 2.6 Characteristics of Control Group Members 
in the Three Experiments
Characteristic  Illinois  Pennsylvania Washington
Total members  3,952  3,354  3,082
Gender (%)
Male 45.3 40.5   39.5
Female 54.7 59.5 60.5
Age (%)
Less than 35 62.2 53.5 52.2
35 to 54 37.8 36.7 39.8
55 and above 0.0 9.7 8.0
Race (%)
White, non-Hispanic 63.2 83.8 83.3
Black 27.1 12.1 4.3
Hispanic 7.6 3.5 7.0
Other 2.1 0.6 5.4
Industry (%)
Manufacturing 26.4 25.8 23.1
Nonmanufacturing 73.6 74.2 76.9
Occupation (%)
White-collar 42.1 34.2
Other occupations 57.9 65.8
Weekly benefit amount ($) 119.93 164.08 150.51
Entitled duration (weeks) 26.0 25.9 26.9





Benefits drawn ($) 2,487.00 2,387.00 2,066.00
Exhaustion rate (%) 47.2 27.7 23.9
Initial UI spell (weeks) 18.3 12.5 11.4
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rate of 5.8 percent would bring the Illinois WBA up to the Washington
level at the time the Washington experiment was launched.  This rate of
increase is not inconsistent with the wage growth rates in this period.  
Pennsylvania had a somewhat more generous UI program than
Washington, as indicated by the higher WBA, despite somewhat lower
base period earnings.  The average weeks of entitled duration are
roughly 26 in all states.  In Illinois and Pennsylvania, 26 weeks is the
standard (although a few UI recipients get only 16 weeks, making the
average for Pennsylvania 25.9 weeks), whereas in Washington it repre-
sents the average over a potential range of 10 to 30 weeks.  
The poorer economic climate in Illinois at the time is indicated by
the considerably longer average weeks of UI benefits, the longer initial
spell of weeks on UI, and the much higher exhaustion rate than in
either Pennsylvania or Washington.  These differences do not carry
over to much higher dollars of benefits drawn, however, because of the
lower WBA.  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RANDOMIZATION PROCESS
The objective of random assignment is to create groups that are
homogeneous in terms of the characteristics that affect outcomes.  If
this is accomplished, a simple comparison of mean outcomes among
treatment and control groups provides an unbiased estimate of the
treatment effects.  The characteristics of claimants in the different
groups, within each experiment, are compared to test the effectiveness
of the assignment process in creating homogeneous groups.  Homoge-
neity is achieved if differences in the distribution of characteristics
among the treatment and control groups are small and generally statis-
tically insignificant.  Chance alone will create some statistically signif-
icant differences.  At a 90 percent confidence level, chance alone would
be expected to produce a statistically significant difference in one out
of ten characteristic comparisons.  Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the
distribution of characteristics generally found to affect the outcomes of
interest—weeks of unemployment or UI benefit payments—in each of
the experiments. 
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For Pennsylvania, the mean values of characteristics across the six
treatment groups and the control group are shown in Table 2.7.  Sixty-
six treatment/control differences were calculated.  Seven of the com-
parisons are statistically different at the 90 percent confidence level,
which is what you would expect by chance alone.  The three differ-
ences at the 95 percent confidence level are what you would expect.  In
all, the Pennsylvania results are not inconsistent with random assign-
ment.26
For Washington, 14 characteristic means are compared across 6
treatment groups and the control group, providing a total of 84 treat-
ment/control group comparisons (Table 2.8).  Chance alone could
account for as many as four statistically significant differences at the
95 percent confidence level and eight at the 90 percent confidence
level.  These are essentially the number of statistically significant dif-
ferences shown in the table.
For Illinois, the means of 11 characteristics are compared in
Table 2.9 for the single treatment and the control groups.  These
results are somewhat less supportive of the conclusion as to the
effectiveness of random assignment, since 4 of the 11 means dif-
fered statistically at the 95 percent confidence level, considerably
more than the 0 or 1 statistically significant differences that chance
alone should account for.   
However, validating the random process does not necessarily mean
that the samples are sufficiently homogenous to warrant use of unad-
justed mean comparisons.  It is shown in Chapter 4 that treatment/con-
trol differences in UI compensation are affected by the inclusion of
WBA (and base earnings) in the Pennsylvania and Washington estimat-
ing equations, requiring use of regression-adjusted treatment/control
comparisons to provide unbiased estimates of treatment.
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Table 2.7 Tests of Randomization in the Pennsylvania Experiment, 



































































































































































 SOURCE: Corson et al. (1991), Table III.7, p. 46; used with permission of Mathemat-
ica Policy Research, Inc.
a The t-statistic of the difference from the control group mean is in parentheses.
* = Significantly different from the control group mean at the 90 percent level of con-
fidence; ** = significantly different from the control group mean at the 95 percent
level of confidence.
b Treatment groups are described by the bonus amount (e.g., “Low”) and the qualifica-
tion period (e.g., “Short”).
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Table 2.8 Tests of Randomization in the Washington Experiment, 



























Age less than 35 
(%)












Age 55 and 
above (%)
8.0    7.7
(0.48)
   7.8
(0.36)
   8.0
(0.01)
   8.2
(0.21)
   8.4
(0.49)
   6.8
(1.47)
Black (%) 4.3    5.2
(1.48)
   4.7
(0.65)
   4.0
(0.43)
   4.7
(0.67)
   4.1
(0.42)
   4.2
(0.23)
Hispanic (%) 7.0    6.8
(0.40)
   6.4
(0.96)
   6.8
(0.28)
   7.0
(0.00)
   6.8
(0.42)




5.4    4.9
(0.76)
   4.6
(1.27)
   4.7
(0.92)
   4.9
(0.84)
   5.1
(0.36)
















































































































SOURCE: Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 5-1, p. 85.
a The t-statistic of difference from the control group mean is in parentheses.  * = Statis-
tically significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** = statisti-
cally significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.
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Table 2.9 Tests of Randomization in the Illinois Experiment, Control and 
Treatment Group Meansa
Variable Control mean Treatment mean
Female (%) 45.3 43.7
(1.45)
Age less than 35 (%) 62.2 61.8
(0.32)
Black (%) 27.1 25.1**
(2.10)
Hispanic (%) 7.6 7.4
(0.27)
Other non-Whites (%) 2.1 2.5
(1.01)
Manufacturing (%) 26.4 24.8
(1.62)
Weekly benefit ($) 119.9 118.8
(1.27)
Base earnings ($) 12,753 12,888
(0.65)
Maximum WBA(%) 35.3 33.1**
(2.15)
White collar (%) 42.1 45.2**
(2.79)
Years of education 11.5 11.8**
(6.03)
SOURCE: Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987).
a The t-statistic of difference from the control group mean is in parentheses. ** = Sig-
nificantly different from the control group mean at the 95 percent level of confidence
for a two-tailed test.
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OPERATIONS
In this section, the operational design and procedures of the three
experiments are described and compared.  All experiments start from
the premise that participation in the experiment is limited to individu-
als who file claims for UI benefits.  Thus, before embarking on a jour-
ney through the bonus experiment, we will digress to describe in some
detail the process of filing a UI claim. 
 The UI Filing Process  
To start the UI filing process, a prospective UI claimant enters a UI
office and files a claim to establish a benefit year.  A benefit year is the
12-month period in which the claimant can draw benefits before having
to reestablish entitlement.  Filing usually occurs the week immediately
after the claimant becomes unemployed.27
In all three states, the claimant returns to the UI office to establish
the waiting week and to claim the first week of compensation two
weeks after filing to establish the benefit year.  In all three states, as in
most states, an eligible claimant must serve a waiting week before ben-
efits can be paid for subsequent weeks of unemployment.  
To receive UI benefits, the claimant must be unemployed at the
start of the benefit year and must be both monetarily and nonmone-
tarily eligible for benefits.  The two terms have technical definitions.
Monetarily eligible means that there are sufficient wage credits in the
base year (usually the first four of the five quarters prior to filing for
benefits) to establish monetary entitlement. Nonmonetarily eligible
means that separation from employment did not occur under conditions
that made the claimant ineligible to receive benefits and that the claim-
ant is “able and available” to work.
In all three states, a claimant is required to register with the ES
some time in the two-week period between filing the initial claim and
claiming the first week of benefits.  Registration with the ES is tied to
the requirement that a UI claimant must be actively seeking work in
order to be eligible for UI benefits.  The registration requirement is not
enforced in Pennsylvania.  In Washington, all UI and ES offices were
joint, so that ES registration occurred at the same time as filing a claim
for benefits.  In Illinois, some offices were joint and other were not.
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Claimants there were required to register with the ES before returning
to the UI office to claim the first week of benefits (plus the waiting
week credit). 
Assignment and Enrollment 
Assignment into the experiment took place in the UI office in the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, but occurred in the
Employment Service office in Illinois.  In all three states, however, eli-
gibility was limited to those claimants filing initial claims to establish a
benefit year.  
We will start with Washington, because the enrollment process
there was simplest and most closely linked to the filing for UI benefits.
For all UI applicants, an on-line computer file was accessed which pro-
vided the status of monetary eligibility and printed an initial statement
of entitlement.  Software was written exclusively for the experiment.  It
used the agency data file to randomly select some of the UI-eligible
claimants according to last two digits of their social security number
and assigned them to treatment or control status.  A computer-gener-
ated form that was provided to every worker filing a claim would also
contain information on the bonus offer if the claimant was assigned to
an experimental treatment.  A treatment-assigned claimant was tenta-
tively enrolled into the experiment; the enrollment was confirmed by
letter when both monetary and nonmonetary UI entitlement were deter-
mined.  This process was also followed in Illinois.   
The process in Pennsylvania differed somewhat, especially with
regard to the timing of assignment and enrollment.  Upon UI applica-
tion, local office staff entered information from the UI application form
into the state computer.  A computer file was then created on the state
system to extract information on all claimants in the demonstration
offices who were determined to be monetarily eligible for UI benefits
during the past week.  The file was transferred to the special demon-
stration data system (the Participant Tracking System), and experiment
eligibility screens were applied (described below).   Once the screening
was completed, a weekly maximum number of individuals was
selected randomly from each office from among the pool of eligible
claimants.  The selected claimants were then assigned randomly to
Design of Three Field Experiments 63
treatment and control groups (by the last two digits of their social secu-
rity number).
Enrollment in Pennsylvania differed from that in Washington
because it occurred at the time the claimant filed a claim to establish
waiting week credit and collect benefits for the first week of compen-
sated unemployment.  Thus, enrollment into the experiment occurred
two weeks after a claimant filed for benefits and excluded claimants
who did not return to claim a waiting week (and a compensable week if
also earned).
Illinois differed from the other two in that assignment and enroll-
ment into the experiment occurred in the ES office at the time the
claimant, who had previously filed for benefits, registered for job
search assistance.  Thus, only UI claimants who registered with the ES
were eligible to participate, thereby de facto excluding most claimants
exempt from job search.  At the end of the registration process, the ES
counselor would inform the selected claimant that he or she was eligi-
ble to participate in an experimental program.  The claimant would
then be asked to wait for a specially trained counselor who would hand
the claimant a printed, one-page instruction sheet and explain the
experiment.  Unique to Illinois, the claimant would be asked to sign an
agreement to participate, but the agreement did not really commit the
claimant to any particular actions.  This requirement was dropped in
Pennsylvania and Washington.  
The enrollment process in all three states was one of attempting to
communicate the nature of the bonus offer and the necessary require-
ments to receive the bonus.  Either in individual counseling sessions or
in group enrollment sessions, the assigned claimant was given a single-
page information sheet and a verbal description of the experiment,
including an explanation of the participant’s actions that would lead to
a bonus.  In Washington, the UI interviewer would end by asking a
series of four questions designed to ensure that the claimant understood
the program.  The low rate at which apparently eligible participants
collected bonuses in Illinois led to increased efforts in Pennsylvania
and Washington to improve claimant’s understanding of the program.
(As described in Chapter 3, there was some improvement in the take-
up rate in Washington over that in Illinois, but not in Pennsylvania.)  
Differences in timing and location of enrollment among the exper-
iments were not merely administrative details; they affected the charac-
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teristics of the sample in each experiment.  In Washington, where
enrollment took place in the UI office at the time the claimant filed for
UI benefits, every claimant eligible for UI benefits was a potential par-
ticipant.  In Pennsylvania, where enrollment took place at the time the
claimant submitted his or her first claim for waiting week credit or
compensation, claimants who obtained jobs within the first two weeks
after filing the initial claim were unlikely to file for the waiting week or
the first compensable week and were thus ineligible for a bonus (Penn-
sylvania data indicated that 6 percent of initial filers didn’t return to file
a continued claim).  The same situation would arise in Illinois for those
claimants who did not register for job search assistance at the same
time as filing an initial claim—this would differ among ES centers,
depending upon whether or not the UI and ES offices were unified. 
An external validity problem arises in the Pennsylvania design,
because in a real program—unlike the experiment—knowledge of the
bonus offer would be universal and claimants could postpone taking
jobs until they had served the waiting week and established entitlement
to the bonus.  The Illinois design also has an external validity issue in
that knowledge of the bonus offer could attract some of those exempt
from job search to register with the ES.  In general, all three experi-
ments have an external validity problem of unknown dimension in that
nonfilers who do not expect to be unemployed very long might file any-
way in a real program to get the bonus. 
Determination of Full Eligibility to Participate
To be fully eligible to participate, the monetarily eligible claimant
must not have had a separation issue on the claim that would prevent
payment of UI benefits.  In Illinois and Washington, but not in Pennsyl-
vania, central office personnel reviewed the claims files of claimants
assigned to experimental treatment groups.  If there were “issues” on
the claim regarding separation from the previous employer, then eligi-
bility for a bonus would be held up until the issue was resolved, and it
was denied if the resolution was against the claimant or was not
resolved prior to the end of the reemployment period.  When the review
showed the claimant to be eligible to receive UI benefits, the agent sent
an enrollment letter to the assigned claimant, informing that person
that he or she was eligible to participate in the experiment.28  A Notice
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of Hire form accompanied the letter, with instructions regarding the
procedures for submission.  In Pennsylvania, the review for nonmone-
tary eligibility did not occur unless the bonus was claimed.
Submitting the Notice of Hire
 The next step in the process occurred when the participating
claimant obtained a full-time job within the qualification period.  In all
three experiments, the claimant informed the central UI office of a job
acquisition that would establish eligibility for a bonus by submitting a
Notice of Hire (NOH) form.  In Illinois, the NOH was actually sent by
the employer, thereby providing instant verification of employment.
The employer verified that the claimant was hired in a job for 30 hours
a week or more, starting on a particular date.  The UI claim file was
then accessed to verify that the hiring date was within the qualification
period and that the claimant stopped receiving UI benefits.  In Wash-
ington and Pennsylvania, the NOH was submitted directly by the
claimant.  The interposition of the employer was eliminated to reduce
the possible stigmatizing effect of requiring the participating claimant
to enlist the support of the employer in his or her quest for a bonus.    
In Pennsylvania and Washington, the NOH provided information
about the claimant’s prior and new jobs, permitting a comparison to
assure that the new job was not a recall to a previous job—a non-issue
in Illinois.  If the employer, occupation title, and wage rates of the prior
and new jobs matched, there was a presumption of a recall and the
employer would be contacted.  Affirmative answers to the query as to
whether the claimant was self-employed or placed on the job by his or
her union would generate letters requesting clarification.  A self-
employed individual could receive a bonus but had to provide proof
that he or she had a business license and some business income.  The
NOH process in Washington and Pennsylvania was more complicated
than in Illinois because claimants could change jobs and still qualify
for a bonus—with the condition that the claimant did not claim benefits
and did not take more than a week between jobs.  A claimant changing
jobs in Washington and Pennsylvania would file an NOH for each job.  
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Submission of the Bonus Voucher
Sixteen or 17 weeks after reemployment, if the claimant had
remained fully employed for the entire period (or changed jobs in
Pennsylvania and Washington, with no more than a week interlude and
no filing for benefits), the claimant submitted a voucher for the bonus
payment.  In Illinois, a valid voucher was certified by the employer
before submission.  In Washington and Pennsylvania, the voucher was
submitted without such certification, but office personnel contacted
employers to verify continual employment for the reemployment
period and checked the UI claim file to ascertain that UI benefits had
not been drawn during the reemployment period.  
For payment of the bonus to be authorized, verification had to
show the following: the claimant had not drawn benefits during the
four-month qualification period; he or she had been employed on a
full-time job (30 hours in Illinois and Pennsylvania, 34 hours per week
in Washington); the first post-unemployment job was not a recall to the
job held prior to filing for benefits or a placement through a union hir-
ing hall; and that any self-employment was documented.  If any of
these issues were not favorable, the claimant would be contacted to
resolve the discrepancies.  When the agent was assured that the condi-
tions for bonus payment had been met, a check would be issued for the
amount of the bonus.
Participation in the Three Experiments
 Table 2.10 shows the numbers of claimants offered enrollment
into the bonus offer experiments and the proportions who participated
at various levels (by submitting NOHs and vouchers for payment of
bonuses).  The proportion of eligibles submitting valid NOHs was
highest in Illinois and lowest in Pennsylvania, as was the case with
payment of bonuses.  In all three experiments, only a small proportion
of eligible enrollees fully participated by receiving a bonus. 
The Illinois results pertain only to the claimant experiment.  If the
employer experiment had been included, the number of assignees
would be double the number in the table.  The drop-off in number of
enrollees was much larger in Illinois than in the other experiments and
was due to refusal to participate.  Since the assignees included only
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those eligible to participate, there is no difference in the number of
enrollees and number of eligibles.  In Pennsylvania, the decline from
assigned to enrolled represents the nonmonetary ineligibility of some
participants.  In Washington, all who were monetarily eligible for UI
were enrolled, but the ineligibles were then eliminated from the sam-
ple.  Thus, much of the difference shown prior to “eligibility” repre-
sents differences in timing of dropping ineligibles from the sample and
is not substantive.  
Despite differences in procedure (discussed above) regarding NOH
submissions that should have disadvantaged Illinois, the proportion of
valid NOFs submitted was greatest in Illinois.  The drop in the number
of participants submitting valid NOHs to the number submitting bonus
vouchers could be accounted for by failure to remain fully employed
for the reemployment period (there might also be some take-up failure,
Table 2.10 Participation in the Three Experimentsa
Illinois Pennsylvania Washington
Participation Number % Number % Number %
Assigned  4,186 11,410  14,080
Enrolled  3,527  10,694  14,080
Eligible  3,527   100 10,694 100 12,140 100  
Submitted NOH  NAb 1,604  15.0 2,533 20.9
Valid NOH    765   21.7 1,315  12.3 2,255 18.6
Submitted bonus 
voucher  NA 1,155 10.8 1,946 16.0
Voucher paid    570   16.2 1,123 10.5 1,816 15.0    
SOURCE: Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987), Table 5-1; Corson et al. (1991), Table
III.3, p. 40 and Table VI.1, p. 77;  Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1983), Table 3-1,
p. 50 and Table 3-2, p. 52. 
a In Illinois, the number assigned includes only those eligible to participate and the
number enrolled includes those who agree to participate.  In Pennsylvania, some of
the eligible assignees did not return to claim a waiting week and therefore were not
enrolled.  All those enrolled were eligible.  In Washington, assignment and enrollment
occurred simultaneously at the time of filing for benefits for all those monetarily eligi-
ble.  Some of those “tentatively” enrolled were found to be ineligible due to nonmon-
etary issues.
b NA = not available.
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as discussed in Chapter 3).  In the end, the procedures adopted to
increase participation in Pennsylvania and Washington were for
naught, as Illinois had the highest proportion of eligible enrollees col-
lecting bonuses.
Monitoring for Operational Performance
In all three experiments, the enrollment rates at the various offices
were monitored to assure compliance with the experimental design.
Monitoring occurred at two levels.  In Pennsylvania and Washington,
there was an on-line Oracle system developed to manage the paper
flow (e.g., tracking claimants and sending out letters and forms) and to
track enrollment rates in the offices.  Staffs of the state agencies and of
the evaluation contractors visited each of the offices, armed with infor-
mation regarding performance.  Real operational problems were
uncovered in only one office in Washington—the claimstaker assigned
to enroll bonus-eligible claimants into the experiment had been trans-
ferred and no one had yet taken her place.  This lapse was immediately
corrected.
A concern was the possible dwindling of interest and parallel
reduction in information flow to the assigned claimant.  Monitoring of
sites did not uncover this tendency.  Overall, it was concluded that the
experiment operated according to design and that any lapses were very
minor.  
THE FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION (FSC) 
PROGRAM IN ILLINOIS: AN UNPLANNED EXPERIMENT
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the impacts of the Illinois experiment
were about double those experienced in similar size treatments in the
other two experiments.  A possible explanation for the large impacts of
the bonus offer in Illinois was the presence in Illinois of a temporary
extended benefit program that did not exist in the other states.  FSC
was a federally funded, national program that existed between 1982
and 1985.  Its discontinuation in Illinois in the middle of the experi-
mental enrollment period had not been anticipated by the research
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designers and resulted in a “natural experiment.”  The FSC program
nationally extended benefits for most recipients by 10 to 16 weeks,
depending upon the state’s unemployment rate.  For Illinois, the exten-
sion for those eligible was 12 weeks.  Most of those claimants enrolled
in the experiment in July and August 1984 had available the 12 weeks
of extended UI benefits in addition to their 26 weeks of state regular
benefits.  After that date, all claimants had only the 26 weeks of regular
benefits available.    
Because the criteria for receiving extended benefits was somewhat
more stringent than that for regular benefits, about 6 percent of the
claimants eligible for regular benefits were not eligible for extended
benefits.  In Chapter 4, we compare the effects of the bonus offer on
two groups: the first group is comprised of those claimants enrolled in
the experiment (or controls) who were eligible for FSC (“FSC-eligi-
bles”), and the second group is comprised of those experimentals and
controls enrolled in the second period who, though not eligible for
FSC, would have been eligible if it had been available (“FSC-ineligi-
bles”).
A natural experiment exists because each of these groups has its
own control group and differs largely because of the FSC availability.
Of course, there are also some other differences between the two
groups due to differences in timing of enrollment, but the average dif-
ference in date of enrollment of two to three months is probably not
substantive. 
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows that the FSC-eligible group partici-
pated to a greater degree than the FSC-ineligible group.  The results in
Chapter 4 show that indeed, the impacts were greater on the FSC-eligi-
ble group, explaining a large part of the differences in impact among
the three experiments.  
Notes
1. Obtaining unbiased estimates of program impact by a process that is essentially
“model free” is the major motivation for an experimental design.  We draw on the
discussion by Hausman and Wise (1985) to present the argument.  Starting with
the premise that any evaluation goal is to estimate an equation of the following
simple form
(1) Y = XB + e,
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where B is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with each element of B measur-
ing the effect on Y of a unit change on the corresponding element of X, and e are
the unmeasured determinants of Y, referred to as the error term. B will be an unbi-
ased estimate of the effect of X on Y if X is uncorrelated with e.  In the operations
of a program, so-called “self-selection” is almost invariably going to create this
correlation.  For example, a government training program (the X variables)
offered to those unable to obtain employment attracts those most motivated to get
jobs (part of the e term), thus X and e are correlated, and if motivation affects out-
comes, then Y and e are correlated, and B is a biased estimate of the effect of X on
Y.  At best, according to Hausman and Wise (1985, p. 189), you can never be sure
that the estimates are unbiased. 
Randomization is a means for assuring that the estimates of B are unbiased.
Suppose there is a treatment, T, and random assignment is used to select persons
to receive the treatment.  Then in the following equation
(2) Y = TB + u,
where T is the treatment and u is the error term, T will be uncorrelated with u, and
therefore B will be an unbiased estimate of the effect of T on Y.
2. Extending the eligibility for an experiment to include potentially eligible as well
as actually eligible persons would permit measurement of such an effect.  For
instance, in the income maintenance experiments, all adults were potentially eligi-
ble and families with incomes considerably above the benefit cut-off point were
enrolled although they would receive no benefits.  Such families, however, could
reduce income in order to become eligible for income maintenance payments.
3. The exception in Washington occurred when claimants obtained employment
that qualified them for a bonus without having established a waiting week for UI
benefits.  In this case, issues that might have resulted in the claimant being ineli-
gible for benefits were not resolved, but the bonus was paid anyway; 7.6 percent
(138/1,813) of those collecting the bonus did not serve a waiting week. 
4. A reason advanced for excluding standbys in Pennsylvania was the desire to avoid
antagonizing employers, who would not like standbys to be encouraged to take
other jobs.  Programmatically, the issue is difficult, because exclusion of standbys
from bonus eligibility might simply encourage workers not to report standby sta-
tus.
5. For a participant to receive a bonus payment while returning to a previous
employer, the claimant must complete a form demonstrating that the position was
different (e.g., different department, different job title, different salary level). 
6. For the first two months of experimental enrollment in Washington (until May 9,
1988), the start of the qualification period for backdated claims was also back-
dated, reducing the length of the effective qualification period.  After that date, the
qualification period started with the filing date, the same as for other enrolled
claimants.  Although the proportion of backdated claims of experimental subjects
increased substantially—from 10 percent to over 20 percent—between the two
periods, the change could not be attributed to the treatment.  This conclusion is
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based on the absence of any statistically significant difference between experi-
mental and control group members in the proportions backdating (see Appendix B
in Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992).  At any rate, the proportion of claim-
ants backdating claims more than two weeks was very small; only 1.4 percent of
treatments and 1.2 percent of controls in Washington.
7. Of the 12,452 treatment-enrolled claimants in Washington, 1,445 were exempt
from job search because of standby status or membership in full referral unions.
The impact analysis showed essentially no difference in measured outcome
including or excluding the exempt group.  Compare Tables 5-4 and 5-5 in Spiegel-
man, O’Leary, and Kline (1992).    
8. The workfare experiments are exceptions.  These were a set of state-level experi-
ments in which randomly selected AFDC recipients were placed into an experi-
mental program and required to work or accept training in order to continue
receiving welfare benefits.   See Gueron and Pauly (1991) for a detailed descrip-
tion of these experiments.
9. The Pennsylvania and Illinois experiments had other components.  The Pennsyl-
vania experiment offered a voluntary job-search workshop of four half-days in
combination with five of the bonus offer treatments.  A sixth treatment was identi-
cal to one of the other treatments but did not include the workshop offer (labeled
“PT4,” a high-bonus, long-qualification-period treatment).  While the workshop
was implemented as designed, so few claimants chose to participate (less than 3
percent) that the workshop was discontinued.  For analysis purposes, the samples
from the two treatments with identical bonus offers were combined and presented
herein as a single high-bonus, low-qualification-period treatment.
The Illinois experiment actually comprised two experiments—a claimant
experiment in which a $500 bonus was offered to assigned UI claimants and an
employer experiment in which the $500 bonus was paid to the employer of the
participating UI claimant who obtained a job under the same conditions.  The
employer experiment is not discussed further in this book, but it is described fully
in the final report of the Illinois experiment (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987) and
more briefly in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987).
10. In Illinois, the fixed bonus offer of $500 was equivalent to an offer 4.2 times the
mean WBA ($120) and ranged in value from 9.8 times the minimum WBA of $51
to 3.1 times the maximum WBA of $161.  
11. Pennsylvania used a parsimonious two-level experiment because of the need to
have treatments that offered job workshops (see note 6 above) and the desire to
experiment with a declining bonus offer.  In this treatment, the bonus offer was set
initially at 6 × WBA, and the offer declined over the qualification period.  This
treatment is not easily compared with the fixed bonus amount offers and further-
more had no effect on UI outcomes.  Therefore, it is not discussed further in this
monograph.  For details, see Corson et al. (1991).  
12. In Pennsylvania, a small proportion of claimants (less than 2 percent) are only eli-
gible for 16 weeks of benefits; the rest are eligible for 26 weeks.
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13. Although some claimants could be expected to accept temporary jobs just to qual-
ify for the bonus, it was difficult, given the rules regarding voluntary quits, for a
claimant to go on and off jobs at will and still collect UI benefits or the bonus.
The evidence from Illinois showed no tendency to shift unemployment from the
first spell to later spells in the benefit year.  
14. The mathematical programming model used for SIME/DIME is described in Con-
lisk and Kurz (1972).
15. Administration and research were paid for out of state funds not subject to these
budgetary constraints.  
16. As discussed previously, the two treatments in Illinois were actually two experi-
ments, the claimant experiment in which bonuses were offered to claimants and
the employer experiment in which bonuses were offered to employers to hire
claimants.
17. Although logic suggests that a bonus offer would only serve to reduce the length
of the unemployment spell, that is not necessarily the case.  For those who would
normally find jobs within the qualification period, the bonus could create an
income effect that would lengthen the unemployment spell.  Only if there is a
compelling case to consider only reductions in unemployment as of interest
should a one-tailed test be adopted. 
18. At that time, a one-tailed statistical significance test was considered appropriate
because of the belief that the bonus could only serve to reduce the length of the
unemployment spell.  Subsequently, theoretical considerations led to an interest in
possible adverse effects of the bonus offer for at least some groups, which sug-
gests a preference for a two-tailed test. 
19. The effect size is a pure number index (called d in Cohen) that is the difference
between the treatment and control group means measured in standard deviation
units.  For a two-tailed test, the effect size index is d = |MA – MB|/s, where d =
effect size index for t tests of means in standard deviation units, MA and MB =
population means expressed in original units, and s = standard deviation of either
population.
20. The power of the test in the table refers to the power of a two-cell test.  If there is
more than one treatment and it is desired to know the joint power of the tests on
all treatments (i.e., what is the probability of rejecting a true effect of any of the
treatments), then one must look at the joint probability.  Thus, if there are three
treatments and each has a power of 0.8, the joint probability of rejecting at least
one true effect is 0.51, i.e., (0.8)3.
21. These sample size considerations do not take into account the desire to learn
about the effectiveness of the experimental treatment on subgroups of the relevant
population, but the costs of having independent treatment groups representing
each interesting subgroup is too large.  The reasons for needing knowledge about
subgroup impacts are either that a policy that strongly affects some population
subgroups and not others may not be politically desirable or that it may suggest
the need for some restructuring of the treatment to better serve some groups.  For
instance, a policy ineffective for some racial groups (or one gender) may not be
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good policy, even if the overall effect is positive.  It must be accepted, however,
that estimating subgroup impacts on fully separated samples reduces the reliabil-
ity of estimates considerably.  For instance, dividing the sample into four sub-
groups (say, two ethnic and two gender groups) implies that, for each of the four
groups, only an effect size twice that for the group as a whole will be detectable at
the same significance level and power.  As discussed in Chapter 4, more parsimo-
nious means of estimating subgroup impacts can be used.
22. See note 10 above for discussion of why the workshop treatment is not being fur-
ther discussed in this book.
23. A detailed discussion of the sample allocation model is provided in Metcalf and
Kerachsky (1988). 
24. Another advantage of a larger number of sites, which is not as yet well under-
stood, is related to the displacement effect discussed in Chapter 6.  The possibility
that displacement would contaminate the control group, thereby compromising
the internal validity of the experiment, is small if the sample size relative to the
size of the relevant labor market is small.  This speaks in favor of smaller samples
in many sites rather than larger samples in fewer sites.  However, this does not
reduce the possibility of displacement in a full-blown program, thereby affecting
the generalizability of experimental results.  
25. Of the 22 ES offices in which the experiment was conducted, 8 were unified (none
of which were in Chicago); 2 others were not unified but were housed in the same
building (both in Chicago); and the other 12 were in separate buildings (7 of
which were in Chicago).
26. This conclusion is reinforced because not all of the 48 tests are independent.  The
most important interdependency occurs because each of the six treatment group
means are compared with the same control group mean.  If one treatment/control
test fails, there is an increased likelihood that other treatment/control tests for the
same characteristic will fail.  As a possible demonstration of this point, among the
six statistically significant differences, there are two pairs.  
27. It may occur before the claimant becomes unemployed based upon an expectation
of imminent unemployment and a desire to establish a benefit year before the
event, or it may occur after the week of becoming unemployed.  In this case, the
benefit year may start in a week prior to the filing week, referred to as a “back-
dated claim.”     
28. There was an exception to this rule in the Washington experiment.  Unlike in
Pennsylvania, claimants who filed and were monetarily eligible for benefits but
who did not proceed to claim a waiting week were still eligible for a bonus.  This
created a small group who might have been ineligible for nonmonetary reasons,
which would only have been determined if the claimant claimed a waiting week.
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